According to Ehring, this is not true. To see why not, he asks us to consider the following simple scenario: a property-instance at tstep one is causally responsible for an instance of the same property at t2. This is a case of causation which is also a case of property persistence. But what does property persistence involve? According to Ehring, property persistence is not just a matter of something not changing its properties. For, even in cases where nothing discernibly changes, the property instantiated at t1 could nevertheless have been replaced by another property of the same type during the period between t1 and t2. To be able to ontologically explain the scenario, therefore, we first need an account of property persistence able to distinguish ‘true property persistence from cases of ‘non-salient property change or what may also be called property type persistence. But, Ehring claims, this is something a theory according to which property instances are states of affairs cannot do (this he demonstrates with the help of a number of thought experiments, which space does not allow me to reproduce here, but cf. Ehring 1997: 91ff). Therefore, causation gives us reason to think that tropes exist (for more reasons to prefer tropes as causal relata, cf. Garcia-Encinas 2009).
This notion, it is argued, is really one or two notions, namely:
According to Garcia (2016), just what part tropes could play into the causation relies upon just how we conceive of nature of tropes. If tropes are the thing that the guy phone calls ‘modifiers, they do not have the smoothness they consult, a fact that would seem to make them smaller appropriate due to the fact causal relata. Not so in the event that tropes is of the module kind (thereby have the character it confer). However if tropes feel the character they confer, Garcia explains, we could possibly constantly inquire, elizabeth.grams.: Could it possibly be the couch or is they the fresh new couchs chair-designed bulk-trope that creates the indentation in the carpet? Garcia believes i’ve cause to think both manage. The couch explanations brand new indentation because of the using, nevertheless mass trope might have sufficed to cause it even when it got existed alone, unbundled on the couchs most other tropes. The brand new role tropes play inside causation can get for this reason be much more tricky than it could initial have a look.
Assume Lisa injury by herself into hot-stove. Among the causal deals you to definitely after that go after might be discussed thus: Lisa eliminated her give on stove once the she sensed pain. This might be a reason which seems to choose ‘in soreness as a whole causally related assets of the end up in. You to definitely ‘in problems are an effective causally associated possessions accords well which have our very own intuitions. Although not, to say it was contributes to dilemmas. The cause of this will be you to mental qualities, that way of ‘being in soreness, will likely be realized because of the myself very different expertise. Hence, mental features can’t be recognized that have bodily of them. At exactly the same time, i seem to inhabit a face-to-face signed and you can causally low-overdetermined universe. But because of this, as opposed to that which we provides going at this point, Lisa don’t dump their hand due to the fact she thought discomfort. Generally speaking, this means one mental services aren’t causally associated, yet not much they appear to be (cf. Kim 1989 to have a well-known term in the disease).
However, this suggests if tropes was of your own component form, i find yourself with a world that’s (objectionably) methodically causally overdetermined
When the qualities is tropes, specific trope theorists have suggested, it end would be resisted (cf. Robb 1997; ; for a crossbreed type cf. Nanay 2009; cf. including Gozzano and you can Orilia 2008). Observe this, we are in need of first so you’re able to disambiguate our notion of property.